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Abstract—To obtain a network with high fault tolerance,
all possible characteristics of a failure event must be captured
in the analysis. Also, an efﬁcient method to identify and then
upgrade vulnerable network components is required. A network
game model between a router and intelligent attacker has
been widely explored to overcome this challenge. In this paper,
based on game theory framework, we have proposed a new
vulnerability identiﬁcation method to measure network relia-
bility when the network is attacked by an intelligent adversary,
who destroys network links to minimize capacity achieved
between two network terminals. A new performance indicator–
expected achievable capacity (EAC) has been proposed to
help quantifying link vulnerability. To obtain EAC, a maximin
problem is formulated and the method of successive averages is
chosen to solve for the game solution. Numerical results show
that the effect of worst-case failure on EAC can be thoroughly
analyzed by the proposed framework.
I. INTRODUCTION
Provision of highly reliable capacity for mission-critical
data communications is the big issue for network planning.
The disruption of a link or a node in the network can greatly
worsen the normal pattern of network usages. Whenever
possible, those links or nodes that are signiﬁcant to the net-
work performance must be made reliable. In the conventional
analysis of network reliability and restoration design [1]-[5],
the most common assumption is that link/node failure events
occur either one at a time or in a simpliﬁed random man-
ner. This assumption is well justiﬁed for failures occurring
naturally. However, in recent years with the emergence of
terrorist attempts, apart from natural failures, it is equally
important that engineers must also be concerned with a new
form of network reliability threat from intentional network
attacks by hackers or terrorists. Building a robust network to
overcome an intentional failure situation involves not only
on protecting the critical network components but also to
alleviate the failure’s effects of any kind.
In the existing literature, the reliability issues based on an
intelligent attacking entity have been widely investigated by
using the framework of game theory. An interesting approach
to cope with the worst case of failure scenario is to make
use of game theoretic stochastic routing (GTSR) [6], [7].
GTSR selects a next hop beginning at a source towards
its destination from the set of possible outgoing links in
an optimal and random manner. Consequently, the number
of eavesdropped/intercepted packets can be minimized by
reducing the predictability of data transmission path.
The game theory has also been used in network reliability
analysis of transportation systems. With game players being
a dispatcher and a demon, the risk in transporting hazardous
materials across a road network can be quantiﬁed [8]. The
game objective is for the transport company to minimize the
risk of exposing hazardous materials upon the road accidents
which occur on purpose to maximize that risk. Likewise,
when the system is a road network, the game players can
be deﬁned as the intelligent drivers that can optimally steer
their vehicles to avoid the road congestion that is worsen
by an imaginary network tester [9]-[11]. In a mobile ad
hoc network (MANET), its reliability of communication has
been modelled by a game competed between a router and
an imaginary network tester [12]. This work has deﬁned a
new cost function to accommodate random link failure costs
due to MANET wireless transmission nature. By solving this
game, the relationship between mean link failure cost and
optimal path selection scenarios can then be investigated.
As seen from the literature, the game theory is a powerful
framework to analyze network reliability. This is especially
true when the worst-case failure conditions are of major
concern and, in response to failure events, the network has
an intelligent mechanism to reroute necessary trafﬁcs away
from the failed components. The existing literature relies
on various deﬁnitions of cost function, depending on the
system measures. These functions include the network delay
or travel time [9]-[11] and the number of eavesdropped or
intercepted packets [6].
In this work, the focus is steered towards a new cost func-
tion in terms of achievable ﬂow capacity between two main
terminals or nodes. The aim is in ﬁnding how much ﬂow at
most can be sent across a network. Indeed, this is inspired
by the fundamental question in the well-known theory of
maximum-ﬂow, minimum-cut problem [13]. However, this
work is aimed at ﬁnding how much reliable ﬂow at most can
be sent across a stochastic network whose components may
fail randomly but in the most disruptive ways. The solution
relies on a newly deﬁned measure, called expected achievable
capacity (EAC), as to be further discussed in Section II. In
addition, from the literature of vulnerability identiﬁcation
[9]-[11], vulnerable network components can be indicated
by using the probability of equipment failure from attacker
who invokes a particular link failure scenario to destroy
links. The most vulnerable link can be identiﬁed by the link
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the failure selection probability of the attacker can have
more than one unique solutions leading to confusion when
identifying the most vulnerable components. To overcome
this drawback, this paper proposes a method to identify
the links whose failure would affect the network achievable
capacity the most. This method can be applied in helping
network engineers sort out the vulnerability of links so that
an efﬁcient link backup plan can be well prepared.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we deﬁne the EAC parameter. In Section III network game
formulation, relevant assumptions, and methods to solve a
game problem are given. Section IV proposes a new vulner-
ability identiﬁcation method to indicate the most vulnerable
link. Section V shows and discusses the numerical results.
Section VI summarizes all ﬁndings from our work.
II. EXPECTED ACHIEVABLE CAPACITY
A network comprises of a set of nodes and links. Links
are indexed by i with the total of I links. Assume that a
link failure scenario j belongs to the failure scenario set of
J possible cases. Also, the set of completely disrupted links,
given the occurrence of link failure scenario j, is represented
by Qj. The functional capacity of link i is Ci, which is
reduced to 0 if it fails. Let Ci,j denote the achieved capacity
from link i under failure scenario j. We then have
Ci,j =

0, i ∈ Qj
Ci, otherwise.
Note here that it is straightforward to extend from this
formulation to partial link failure events where the failure
does not disrupt the whole link capacity. A source node tries
to send its data trafﬁc towards its destination with the total
of K possible paths. The set L(k) of links along path k is
chosen by the source node. There are two possibilities for the
maximum capacity achieved from path k when link failure
scenario j occurs. Firstly, if a link on path k fails, then the
path cannot carry any data trafﬁc. Secondly, if path k is
not damaged under failure scenario j, then the achievable
capacity equals the capacity of the bottleneck link on that
path. Both cases bound the achievable capacity as
Rk,j = min
i∈L(k)
Ci,j (1)
where Rk,j deﬁnes the achievable capacity of path k under
failure scenario j. For notational convenience, the payoff
table of achievable capacity can be written in the matrix
form
R =



R1,1 ... R1,J
. . .
...
. . .
RK,1 ... RK,J


 (2)
In our formulated network game with mixed strategy,
the sender selects path k with probability hk and the
failure scenario j occurs with probability qj. The matrix
form of these strategy selection probabilities are H
T =
[h1,...,hK], Q
T = [q1,...,qJ].
We deﬁne a new game cost function, Expected Achievable
Capacity (EAC) as the maximum capacity achieved on
average at the interval of data transmission when the worst-
case link failure occurs. Given H and Q, EAC can then be
calculated from R directly:
EAC =
K X
k=1
J X
j=1
hkqjRk,j = H
TRQ. (3)
III. GAME FORMULATION AND SOLUTION METHODS
A. Player Strategy and Aim
In this section, network reliability analysis is visualized
as a network game between two players, a router and an
intelligent network attacker. Both players are assumed to be
rational players. That is, the router objective is to maximize
the achievable capacity by utilizing the optimal stochastic
routing technique. Conversely, the network attacker objective
is to minimize the achievable capacity by choosing to invoke
random failure scenarios in an optimal manner. In this game,
the objective cost function is directly computable from the
proposed EAC, which is deﬁned in (3). In the well-known
maximin game formulation, the router seeks the best path
selection strategy H by solving
max
H
min
Q
H
TRQ. (4)
and the attacker seeks the worst-case failure scenario Q by
solving
min
Q
max
H
H
TRQ. (5)
Both (4) and (5) are optimized subject to the following
constraints
K X
k=1
hk = 1,H ≥ 0,
J X
j=1
qj = 1,Q ≥ 0 . (6)
From game theory literature, it is well known that we
can transform (4)-(6) into a linear programming formulation
[9]-[12]. J. V. Neumann [14] has shown that both optimal
values obtained from (4) and (5) are the same and unique.
Thus, the uniqueness of the EAC is guaranteed and the Nash
equilibrium exists in this game. However, note that, path
selection probabilities and link failure selection probabilities
of both players at the Nash equilibrium may not be unique,
as to be seen in Section V.
B. Solving Game by Method of Successive Averages
By updating selection probability for all possible strategies
in each turn, the well-known method of successive averages
(MSA) [11] has been here chosen to ﬁnd a mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium solution to the maximin problem. An
advantage of MSA over linear programming is that it can
solve maximin and network reliability problems even when
link costs are trafﬁc dependent [11], [15]. For completeness,
the solution method by MSA are summarized as follows.
1) At the beginning, set the turn index n = 1 and
initialize the strategy selection probabilities for bothrouter player (hk) and attacker player (qj) by hk =
1
K,qj = 1
J.
2) Router calculates EAC, given each path selection
strategy k (k = 1,2,...,K), from Ek[Rk,j] = PJ
j=1[qjRk,j].
3) Router decides on the best path selection strategy ˆ k to
maximize Ek[Rk,j] from ˆ k = argmax
k
Ek[Rk,j].
4) Router updates the new path selection probability (hk)
by MSA as
hk ← (
1
n
)xk + (
n − 1
n
)hk; xk =

1, if k = ˆ k
0, otherwise .
5) Attacker calculates EAC, given each failure scenario j
(j = 1,2,...,J), from Ej[Rk,j] =
PK
k=1[hkRk,j].
6) Attacker selects the best attacking strategy ˆ j to mini-
mize Ej[Rk,j] from ˆ j = argmin
j
Ej[Rk,j].
7) Attacker updates failure selection probability (qj) by
using MSA:
qj ← (
1
n
)yj + (
n − 1
n
)qj; yj =

1, if j = ˆ j
0, otherwise .
8) Evaluate EAC from the game at iteration n
EAC =
K X
k=1
J X
j=1
hkqjRk,j.
9) If the selection probabilities hk, qj and EAC obtained
are more different for the previous and current itera-
tions than a tolerable threshold, then update n ← n+1
and go back to step 2. Otherwise, stop this recursion.
Note that, in steps 3 and 6, if there are at least two different
strategies which yield the same EAC, then those strategies
will be selected in a uniform random manner.
As the network grows in size and path alternatives in-
crease, it is interesting to consider a more efﬁcient algo-
rithm apart from MSA in order to help reduce the burden
of computational complexity. For example, the best-reply
replicator dynamics in MSA can be replaced by a better-
reply dynamics, where a player is allowed to opt for a better
solution in each iteration, but not necessary the best. Not all
actions need to be evaluated in each iteration. This results in
an overall computational savings despite more iterations may
be needed for a convergence. Such new iterative procedure
warrants a worthy future investigation.
In the existing network game literature, the link vulnera-
bility identiﬁcation under the worst-case link-failure scenario
relies on the attackers’ link failure selection probability [9]-
[11]. Nevertheless, it is possible to obtain multiple solutions
from a network game and this may lead us to indicate
an ambiguous set of vulnerable network links. Therefore,
relying on failure selection probability is not reasonable for
identiﬁcation of link vulnerability. We need to change the
vulnerability identiﬁcation method to cope with this problem.
IV. VULNERABILITY IDENTIFICATION METHOD
Although failure selection probability can converge to
multiple points of game solution, the proposed EAC always
converges to a unique value. Therefore, we propose to use
the EAC value to help identifying the network component
vulnerability. The main concept of the proposed method is
to quantify the effect of link capacity reduction on EAC.
Hence, the proposed vulnerability identiﬁcation begins with
the removal of a certain amount of capacity from each link.
Then, by using MSA, the remaining network with reduced
capacity is analyzed for the EAC value of game. This value
represents the obtainable maximum ﬂow that can still pass
through the remaining network when the worst-case link-
failure scenario occurs. Let EACi(α) be the obtained EAC
when link i is degraded by α capacity units. A link is said
to be vulnerable if it causes the reduction of EAC once it
is degraded. Therefore, the most vulnerable link ˆ i is deﬁned
by the link which gives the lowest EAC from
ˆ i = argmin
i
EACi(min(α,Ci)). (7)
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. Comparison of Vulnerability Identiﬁcation Methods
All numerical experiments throughout this paper are con-
ducted to investigate a single link failure scenario, i.e. Qm =
{m};∀m = 1,2,...,I. In this part, the comparison of result
characteristics from two different vulnerability identiﬁcation
methods are given, namely, the identiﬁcation method in [9]-
[11], and the newly proposed method in Section IV. Fig. 1
shows a network with each link capacity of 200 units.
At the equilibrium, two different solutions of link failure
selection probabilities are obtained (see Fig. 2). By [9]-[11],
vulnerable network links can be indicated from the links with
high failure selection probabilities. Fig. 2(a) indicates that
links 2 and 5 are vulnerable links while Fig. 2(b) indicates
that links 1, 2, 4, and 5 are vulnerable links. Both of these
solution sets contradict each other because the vulnerable
links indicated from Fig. 2(a) and Fig. 2(b) are not the
same. Therefore, using link failure selection probability is
not suitable to identify vulnerable links.
The proposed vulnerability identiﬁcation method is now
applied to analyze the same network. Fig. 3 shows the effect
of link capacity degradation on the obtained EAC. Each
graph represents the EAC when a link capacity is reduced.
From the result, the proposed method produces only one
solution set where links 1, 2, 4, and 5 are equally signiﬁcant
to the overall EAC. The result indicates that these four links
must have the same level of protection because they give
the same pattern of EAC reduction once they are degraded.
In addition, this solution corresponds to the minimum-cut
consisting of links 1, 2, 4, and 5. Because the solution is
unique, looking for vulnerable network link by using EAC is
more appropriate than using link failure selection probability.
B. Network Vulnerability Identiﬁcation
The identiﬁcation of link vulnerability to the overall EAC
is investigated in this part. Fig. 4 represents a grid networkFig. 1. A small network example.
Fig. 2. Two different solutions of link failure selection probabilities from
the game at the convergence point.
Fig. 3. Effect of capacity reduction on EAC for the small network.
with the capacity of links 1 to 12 of 11000, 6000, 2000,
15000, 31000, 1000, 32000, 7000, 28000, 17000, 22000,
and 14000 units, respectively. This is also the network
conﬁguration used in [8]. Fig. 5 shows the effect of link
capacity degradation on EAC. The most vulnerable link can
then be identiﬁed using (7). If the target is on the overall
system performance when a link is completely failed, then
the link whose complete failure gives the lowest EAC must
be protected ﬁrst, i.e. links 1, 3, 10 and 12. Obviously, the
remaining network without one of these four links cannot
send any ﬂows if it is attacked by an intelligent attacker.
This is because both terminals in the remaining network
can be disconnected by failing only one link. Consequently,
the obtained EAC becomes 0 if any of these four links are
removed.
When the target is to prevent the effect of partial capacity
reduction, the link which yields the lowest EAC once its
capacity is degraded must be protected ﬁrst. To select α
when a link is marginally degraded, the type of capacity
degradation depends on the design criteria and severity of
failure. For example, a complete link failure may be caused
by ﬁber-cut from nuclear/terrorist attacks, or partial link
degradation from occasional routine maintenance in which
a fraction of link capacity might be disturbed. In practice,
because the most vulnerable link can be changed depending
on the value of α (see Fig. 5), network designers have
to properly choose the level of α that closely reﬂects the
severity of failure event which generally occurs in their
network. Another approach to ﬁnd the most vulnerable links
can be done by setting the minimum requirement of EAC and
varying the α value from 0 to the highest link capacity in the
network. For the most vulnerable link, even gradual reduction
of its capacity can sharply decrease the EAC to lower than
the minimum EAC requirement. Therefore, one may sort
the link vulnerability according to their minimum capacity
needed be taken out to violate the network’s minimum EAC
requirement.
From Fig. 5, the vulnerable network components identiﬁed
by (7) do not always correspond to links in the minimum-
cut set. For instance, by minimum-cut set, links 1 and 3 are
vulnerable links. However, apart from links 1 and 3, Fig. 5
shows that link 8 is another vulnerable link. For instance, if
the capacity degradation α = 7,000 units, then our analysis
suggests that link 8 is even more vulnerable than link 1. In
this respect, one can conclude that the analysis via α is more
reﬁned than that of minimum-cut analysis because the link
can be degraded at any level, not necessarily as a whole.
Further, it can be noticed that links 4, 7, 8 and 11 have no
effects on the overall EAC when their capacity is reduced.
This is because the router can ﬁnd a set of better alternative
paths and then completely re-route all the trafﬁc away from
these links. As a result, reducing capacity of these links does
not affect the obtained EAC.
The proposed vulnerability identiﬁcation method can be
applied to the real network conﬁguration. Fig. 6 shows the
Asia-Paciﬁc Advanced Network (APAN) backbone network
topology. The link number, capacity and connectivity of theFig. 4. Grid network with six possible paths for router player.
Fig. 5. Effect of link capacity reduction on EAC for a grid network.
APAN network are given in Table I [16]. The effect of link
capacity reduction is given in Fig. 7 where the considered
demand pair is a connection between China and Australia.
From Fig. 7, the proposed vulnerability identiﬁcation method
can identify the vulnerable network links which are links 4,
6, 10, 11, 25, 26, and 27. If preventing the complete link
failure is the major concern, then links 26 and 27 must be
protected most.
It is interesting to note that, after a link is degraded, the
attacker would try to fail the remaining high-capacity links in
order to leave the low-capacity links for data transmission. To
avoid achieving low capacity between the considered demand
pair, upgrading these low capacity links would eventually
improve the obtained EAC at the occurrence of the worst-
case link-failure event.
C. Effect of Different Failure Scenarios
Quantiﬁcation of failure effect, in practice, needs to con-
sider the relevant causes of network component failures i.e.
(i) speciﬁc temporally-isolated failures each of which can
always be restored before the next failure event occurs (SF),
(ii) uniform random failures that randomly occur across
the whole network (URF) and (iii) the worst-case random
failures that are caused intentionally by attackers to minimize
EAC (WCRF). The network topology in Fig. 4 is used
to show the comparison of the EAC obtained from three
different failure types where each link has 200 units of
Fig. 6. Asia-Paciﬁc Advanced Network (APAN) backbone network
topology. The test used 25 paths to send data between China and Australia.
All links are assumed to be bidirectional.
TABLE I
LINK CONNECTION CAPACITY
link connection capacity link connection capacity
(Mbps) (Mbps)
1 China-Russia 155 15 Thai-USA 155
2 Russia-EU 155 16 Malaysia-Japan 45
3 EU-USA 30000 17 Singapore-Japan 45
4 China-Korea 310 18 Taipei-Japan 622
5 Korea-EU 155 19 Singapore-Taipei 155
6 Korea-USA 1244 20 Philippine-Japan 45
7 Korea-Japan 2000 21 Philippine-Japan 155
8 China-USA 155 22 Singapore-USA 155
9 China-USA 45 23 Japan-Hawaii 155
10 China-Japan 2000 24 Taipei-USA 6600
11 Japan-USA 30000 25 Hawaii-USA 10000
12 China-Taipei 100 26 Hawaii-Australia 10000
13 Thai-Japan 44 27 Australia-USA 10000
14 Thai-Japan 45
capacity (see Fig. 8). From Fig. 8, SF event has the least
effect on the EAC reduction because a single link failure
speciﬁcally occurs only on one link, and hence the router
can eventually adapt the optimal stochastic routing policy
to completely avoid the failed component. However, when
a single link fails randomly, the routing attempts cannot
successfully transmit the ﬂow every time because of the
randomness of failure events. This results in the reduction
of EAC which gives the EAC lower than the SF case. At the
Nash equilibrium, the WCRF event from game theoretical
analysis can cause the transmission attempt to fail more
frequently than the URF event, and WCRF event therefore
gives the lowest EAC. To ensure that all types of possible
failure events are prevented, reliability evaluation must be
based on the worst-case result in order to analyze and protect
the network in the most robust way.
VI. CONCLUSION
The contribution of this work is twofold. Firstly, we
propose the EAC as a new network reliability indicator.
Secondly, we propose a new method to identify link vul-
nerability from the EAC. The work scope is limited to only
a single demand pair between two terminals. Previously, the
multiple solution problem of strategies found at the game
equilibrium introduces a difﬁculty in the identiﬁcation of link
vulnerability. This problem has been in this paper resolved
by the proposed vulnerability identiﬁcation method whichFig. 7. Effect of link capacity reduction on EAC for the APAN network.
Fig. 8. EAC comparison for different failure scenarios. For SF case, the
result of failing only one link is the same for every link.
can thoroughly sort out the vulnerable links in both aspects
of failure (i.e. complete or partial link failure). To efﬁciently
prevent a network from an intentional failure situation, the
identiﬁcation of system vulnerability, and reliability consid-
eration must be based on the worst-case analysis. And, based
on the obtained results, it is believed that the proposed EAC
indicator via game theory framework could be most useful
in such worst cases of failure analysis.
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